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HARNACK’S INEQUALITY FOR P-HARMONIC
FUNCTIONS VIA STOCHASTIC GAMES
HANNES LUIRO, MIKKO PARVIAINEN, AND EERO SAKSMAN
Abstract. We give a proof of Lipschitz continuity of p-harmonious
functions, that are tug-of-war game analogies of ordinary p-harmonic
functions. This result is used to obtain a new proof of Harnack’s in-
equality for p-harmonic functions in the case p > 2 that avoids classical
techniques like Moser iteration, but instead relies on suitable choices of
strategies for the stochastic tug-of-war game.
1. Introduction
Considerable progress was made in the mid-1950s and -l960s in the regu-
larity theory of elliptic equations due to the discoveries of DeGiorgi [DeG57],
Nash [Nas58] and Moser [Mos60, Mos61]. DeGiorgi and Nash proved that
solutions to certain elliptic partial differential equations are Ho¨lder continu-
ous whereas Moser showed that non-negative solutions satisfy the Harnack
inequality. Such an inequality can be used, in turn, to prove the Ho¨lder
continuity of solutions. This development settled Hilbert’s 19th problem.
In this paper, we present a completely new and rather straightforward
proof for the Harnacks’s inequality for solutions to p-Laplace equation
∆pu = div(|∇u|
p−2∇u) = 0
for 2 < p <∞. It is worth emphasizing that, quite surprisingly, our method
readily produces Lipschitz continuity estimates. The proof utilizes a recently
discovered connection between stochastic games and p-harmonic functions,
see [PS08]. The argument is based on a choice of a strategy, and is thus
completely different from the proofs of De Giorgi, Moser, or Nash.
Fix ε > 0 and consider the following two-player zero-sum-game from
[MPRd]. At the beginning, a token is placed at a point x0 ∈ Ω ⊂ R
n and
the players toss a biased coin with probabilities α and β, α + β = 1. If
they get heads (probability α), they play a tug-of-war, that is, a fair coin
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is tossed and the winner of the toss is allowed to move the game position
to any x1 ∈ Bε(x0). On the other hand, if they get tails (probability β),
the game state moves according to uniform probability (with respect to
normalized Lebesgue measure) to a random point in the ball Bε(x0). Then
they continue playing the same game from x1. Once the game position
reaches the boundary, Player II pays Player I the amount given by a pay-
off function F . Naturally, Player I tries to maximize and Player II tries
to minimize the expected payoff, and in this way we obtain the value of
the game, which is denoted by uε. The value of this game approximates a
p-harmonic function when we choose suitable α and β according to p and
n. The pay-off function is defined in a suitable ε-neighbourhood of the
boundary, and it can be thought as the prescribed boundary values of uε. In
the limit ε → 0 the value function uε tends to a p-harmonic function with,
loosely speaking, boundary values F.
We obtain Lipschitz continuity (Theorem 3.2), an oscillation estimate
(Corollary 3.3), and Harnack’s inequality (Theorem 5.2) for game values.
Similarly, we obtain an oscillation estimate and Harnack’s inequality for p-
harmonic functions (respectively Corollary 3.4 and end of Section 4). In the
case p > n, a player can force the game to a point with a positive probability
and the proof for Harnack’s inequality is even simpler (Corollary 6.2).
The argument for Theorem 3.2 is based on a cancellation strategy, in
which Player II has two goals: he tries to to cancel the effect of Player I
and move to a target direction fixed number of times. If Player II reaches
his goals, which occurs with high enough probability, then the expected
value has a symmetric component. Finally, we can utilize this symmetry in
comparing the values for the games starting from different points.
The classical linear interplay between harmonic functions and martingales
is well known. In the nonlinear case, a connection of the tug-of-war game
to so called infinity harmonic functions was established by Peres, Schramm,
Sheffield and Wilson in [PSSW09], see also [LA98], [Obe05], and [LeG07].
This has inspired further studies to many different directions, see for example
[PPS10], [AB10], [MPRc] as well as led to simplified proofs in the theory of
PDEs, see for example [AS10].
2. Preliminaries
Let us start by fixing the basic notation used throughout the work. We
denote
Bρ(x0) = {x ∈ R
n : |x− x0| < ρ }.
When no confusion arises, we drop the common center point in statements
and denote Br, B2r etc. The integral average of u is denoted by∫
Bρ
u(x) dx =
1
|Bρ|
∫
Bρ
u(x) dx,
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where |Bρ| denotes the Lebesgue measure of Bρ.
Fix p > 2. Let Ω ⊂ Rn be a bounded domain and fix ε > 0. To prescribe
boundary values we introduce the compact boundary strip of width ε by
setting
Γε := {x ∈ R
n \ Ω : dist(x, ∂Ω) ≤ ε}.
We next recall the two-player zero-sum-game called ’tug-of-war with noise’.
At the beginning, a token is placed at a point x0 ∈ Ω and the players toss a
biased coin with probabilities α and β, α+ β = 1. Here
α = α(p) :=
p− 2
n+ p
and β = β(p) :=
n+ 2
n+ p
. (2.1)
If they get heads (probability α), they play a tug-of-war, that is, a fair coin
is tossed and the winner of the toss is allowed to move the game position to
any x1 ∈ Bε(x0). On the other hand, if they get tails (probability β), the
game state moves according to the uniform probability to a random point
in the ball Bε(x0). Then they continue playing the same game from x1.
This procedure yields a sequence of game states x0, x1, . . . where every
xk is a random variable. We denote by xτ ∈ Γε the first point in Γε in the
sequence, where τ refers to the first time we hit Γε. The payoff is F (xτ ),
where F : Γε → R is a given, bounded, Borel measurable payoff function.
Player I earns F (xτ ) while Player II earns −F (xτ ).
A history of a game up to step k is a vector of the first k+1 game states
x0, . . . , xk and k coin tosses c1, . . . , ck, that is,
(x0, (c1, x1), . . . , (ck, xk)) . (2.2)
Here cj ∈ C := {0, 1, 2}, where 0 denotes that Player I wins, 1 that Player
II wins and 2 that a random step occurs.
A strategy SI for Player I is a collection of Borel-measurable functions that
give the next game position given the history of the game i.e. next move as
a function of all previously played moves and all previous coin tosses. For
example
SI(x0, (c1, x1), . . . , (ck, xk)) = xk+1 ∈ Bε(xk)
if Player I wins the toss. Similarly Player II plays according to a strategy
SII.
Let Ωε = Ω ∪ Γε ⊂ R
n. The space of all game sequences (and our proba-
bility space) will be
H∞ = x0 × (C,Ωε)× . . . .
Writing ω = (x0, (c1, x1), . . .) ∈ H
∞, define the random variable time τ by
τ(ω) = inf{k : xk ∈ Γε, k = 0, 1, . . .}. (2.3)
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This τ(ω) is a stopping time relative to the filtration {Fk}
∞
k=0, where F0 :=
σ(x0) and
Fk := σ(x0, (c1, x1), . . . , (ck, xk)) for k ≥ 1. (2.4)
The fixed starting point x0 and the strategies SI and SII determine a
unique probability measure Px0SI ,SII on the natural product σ-algebra. In
particular, this measure is defined on the sets of the type x0 × (C1, B1) ×
. . ., where Ci ⊂ C and the Bi ⊂ Ωε are Borel subsets. The probabilility
measure is built by applying Kolmogorov’s extension theorem to the family
of transition probabilities (compare to [MPRd, Section 2])
πSI,SII (x0, (c1, x1) . . . , (ck, xk), (C,A))
=
α
2
δ0(C)δSI(x0,(c1,x1)...,(ck,xk))(A) +
α
2
δ1(C)δSII(x0,(c1,x1)...,(ck,xk))(A)
+ βδ2(C)
|A ∩Bε(xk)|
|Bε(xk)|
,
(2.5)
as long as xk ∈ Ω, otherwise if xk 6∈ Ω, the transition probability forces
xk+1 = xk.
The expected payoff, when starting from x0 and using the strategies
SI, SII, is
E
x0
SI,SII
[F (xτ )] =
∫
H∞
F (xτ (ω)) dP
x0
SI ,SII
(ω). (2.6)
Note that, due to the fact that β > 0, or equivalently p < ∞, the game
ends almost surely
P
x0
SI,SII
({ω ∈ H∞ : τ(ω) <∞}) = 1
for any choice of strategies. Namely, since Ω is bounded we may choose
N0 ≥ 1 large enough so that N0ε > 2 diam(Ω). Then the random walk
with step uniformly distributed in Bε(0) jumps out of Ω with a positive
probability, uniform with respect to the initial point. The claim follows by
observing that almost surely the game will contain infinitely many blocks of
length N0 consisting of solely random moves.
The value of the game for Player I is given by
uεI (x0) = sup
SI
inf
SII
E
x0
SI,SII
[F (xτ )]
while the value of the game for Player II is given by
uεII(x0) = inf
SII
sup
SI
E
x0
SI,SII
[F (xτ )].
For basic properties of the value functions (like measurability issues) we refer
to [MS96].
Observe that history contains more information than in [MPRc, MPRd]
where the history only contained the previous game positions and the strate-
gies were defined accordingly, for example SI(x0, x1, . . . , xk) = xk+1 ∈ Bε(xk).
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Nevertheless, intuitively the player can not do better than to step into a max-
imum/minimum of the underlying value function, and thus this formalism
produces the same value functions as we shall verify next.
Proposition 2.1. Let Ω ⊂ Rn be a bounded open set. Let u be a value
function for Player I defined with history (2.2), and v the corresponding
value function defined with history that only contains the previous game
positions. Both functions have the same boundary values F . Then
u = v.
The same result also holds for the value function for Player II.
Proof. We show that by choosing a strategy according to the minimal values
of v, and by adding an arbitrarily small correction term, Player II can make
the process a supermartingale. The optional stopping theorem then implies
that u is bounded by v up to a small correction. The reverse direction is
obtained by a similar argument
Player I follows any strategy and Player II follows a strategy S0II such that
at xk−1 ∈ Ω he chooses to step to a point that almost minimizes v, that is,
to a point xk ∈ Bε(xk−1) such that
v(xk) ≤ inf
Bε(xk−1)
v + η2−k
for some fixed η > 0 (when proving the reverse, player I, in turn, tries to
almost maximize the value of v). We start from the point x0. It follows that
E
x0
SI,S
0
II
[v(xk) + η2
−k |Fk−1]
≤
α
2
{
inf
Bε(xk−1)
v + η2−k + sup
Bε(xk−1)
v
}
+ β
∫
Bε(xk−1)
v dy + η2−k
≤ v(xk−1) + η2
−(k−1),
where we have estimated the strategy of Player I by sup. We also used
the fact that according to [MPRc], v satisfies the dynamic programming
principle
v(xk−1) =
α
2
{
inf
Bε(xk−1)
v + sup
Bε(xk−1)
v
}
+ β
∫
Bε(xk−1)
v dy.
Thus
Mk = v(xk) + η2
−k
is a supermartingale with respect to the filtration {Fk}k≥0 defined in (2.4).
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Also later on our martingale considerations are always with respect to
this filtration. We deduce
u(x0) = sup
SI
inf
SII
E
x0
SI,SII
[F (xτ )] ≤ sup
SI
E
x0
SI,S
0
II
[F (xτ ) + η2
−τ ]
≤ sup
SI
E
x0
SI,S
0
II
[M0] = v(x0) + η,
where we used the optional stopping theorem on the uniformly bounded
martingale Mk. Since η was arbitrary this proves the claim. 
Now, the results in [MPRd] are directly at our disposal. Especially, by
combining the previous Proposition with [MPRd, Theorems 1.2 and 1.4] we
obtain
Proposition 2.2. It holds that uε := u
ε
I
= uε
II
, the value uε is the unique
Borel measurable function with fixed boundary values F that satisfies the
dynamic programming principle, i.e.
uε(x) =
α
2
{
inf
Bε(x)
uε + sup
Bε(x)
uε
}
+ β
∫
Bε(x)
uε dy, (2.7)
for x ∈ Ω. In addition, uε can alternatively be defined using (2.7), and is
sometimes called p-harmonious function.
Concrete choices of the strategy for one of the players can be used to
estimate p-harmonious functions via the following observation
Lemma 2.3. Let τ∗ be a stopping time with respect to the filtration (2.4)
with τ∗ ≤ τ , where τ is the stopping time in (2.3). Then
uε(y) ≤ sup
SI
E
y
SI,S0II
(uε(xτ∗)),
for any fixed S0
I
. Similarly
uε(y) ≥ inf
SII
E
y
S0
I
,SII
(uε(xτ∗)),
for any fixed S0
II
.
Proof. By symmetry it is enought to prove the first statement. Assume that
we are given a fixed strategy S0II. Let then Player I follow again (compare
the proof of Proposition 2.1) a strategy SmaxI such that at xk−1 ∈ Ω he
chooses to step to a point that almost maximizes uε, that is, to a point
xk ∈ Bε(xk−1) such that
uε(xk) ≥ sup
Bε(xk−1)
uε − η2
−k
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for some fixed η > 0. By this choice and (2.7), we get
E
x0
Smax
I
,S0
II
[uε(xk)− η2
−k |Fk−1]
≥
α
2
{
inf
Bε(xk−1)
uε + sup
Bε(xk−1)
uε − η2
−k
}
+ β
∫
Bε(xk−1)
uε dy − η2
−k
≥ uε(xk−1)− η2
−(k−1).
Hence under these strategies Mk = uε(xk)−η2
−k is a submartingale. Again
by the optional stopping theorem it follows that
sup
SI
E
y
SI,S
0
II
[uε(x
∗
τ )] ≥ E
y
Smax
I
,S0
II
[uε(x
∗
τ )]
≥ Ey
Smax
I
,S0
II
[uε(x
∗
τ )− η2
−τ∗ ]
≥ Ey
Smax
I
,S0
II
[M0] = uε(y)− η.
Since η > 0 is arbitrary, this completes the proof. 
3. Local Lipschitz estimate
In this section, we show that the value function for the game is asymp-
totically Lipschitz continuous. By passing to limit with the step size, we
obtain a new and direct game theoretic proof for Lipschitz continuity of
p-harmonic functions with p > 2. In the next section we then obtain the
Harnack inequality as a quick corollary. The proof of the Lipschitz regular-
ity (and Harnack’s inequality) is based on the choice of strategies, and is
thus completely different from the proofs based on the works of De Giorgi,
Moser, or Nash, see [DeG57], [Mos60, Mos60], and [Nas58].
The proof of the Lipschitz estimate is divided in two parts. In the first one
(the ’linear’ part of the proof) we estimate the probability of a specialized
random walk (called ’cylinder walk’) to hit a certain part of a boundary first.
The needed estimate is fairly standard, and we give a complete proof for the
readers convenience in the appendix. The second part (the ’non-linear part’)
contains the core of the argument, and its proof is quite transparent as it
applies a naturally chosen strategy for the tug-of-war game.
Cylinder walk. Constants α, β > 0 with α + β = 1 are determined by
the exponent p > 2 as before in (2.1). Consider the following random walk
(called the ‘cylinder walk’) in a n + 1 -dimensional cylinder. Suppose that
we are at a point (xj , tj) ∈ B2r(0) × [0, 2r], where r > 0 is fixed. With
probability α/2 we move to the point (xj , tj−ε), and with α/2 to (xj , tj+ε).
With probability β we move to the point (xj+1, tj), where xj+1 is randomly
chosen from the ball Bε(xj).
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The next lemma gives a quite intuitive estimate for the probability that
the cylinder walk escapes though the bottom; the proof is given in the
appendix.
Lemma 3.1. Let us start the cylinder-walk from the point (0, t). Then the
probability that the walk does not escape the cylinder through its bottom is
less than
C(p, n)(t+ ε)/r,
for all ε > 0 small enough.
We are ready for one of our main results.
Theorem 3.2. Let uε be a p-harmonious positive function in Ω and assume
that B10r(z0) ⊂ Ω and r > ε. Then
|uε(x)− uε(y)| ≤ C(p, n)r
−1|x− y|( sup
B6r(z0)
uε − inf
B6r(z0)
uε))
for all x, y ∈ Br(z0) with |x− y| ≥ ε.
Proof. Let x, y ∈ Br(z0) and choose integer m comparable to |x− y| /ε, for
example (m−1)ε ≤ |x−y| < mε. Fix z ∈ B2r(z0) so that |z−x| = |z−y| =
(m−1)ε. We define a strategy S0II for Player II for the game that starts from
x. The simple idea is the following: he always tries to cancel the earliest
move of Player I which he has not yet been able to cancel. If all the moves at
that moment are cancelled and he wins the coin toss, then he moves vector
ε
(
m− 1
m
)
z − x
|z − x|
,
where the factor 1 − 1m =
m−1
m is due to the fact that the players cannot
step to the boundary of Bε(x).
At every moment we can divide the game position as a sum of vectors
x+
∑
k∈I1
u1k +
∑
k∈I2
u2k +
∑
k∈I3
vk .
Here I1 denotes the indices of rounds when Player I has moved, vectors u
1
k
are her moves, and correspondingly the u2k represent the moves of Player II.
Set I3 denotes the indices when we have taken a random move, and these
vectors are denoted by vk.
Then we define a stopping time τ∗ for this process. We give three condi-
tions to stop the game:
(i): If Player II has won m more times than Player I.
(ii): If Player I has won at least 2rε times more than Player II.
(iii): If |
∑
k∈I3
vk| ≥ 2r.
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This stopping time is finite with probability 1, and does not depend on
strategies nor starting points.
Let us then consider the situation when the game has ended by reason (i).
In this case, the sum of the steps made by players can easily be computed,
and it is ∑
k∈I1
u1k +
∑
k∈I2
u2k = m
(
m− 1
m
)
ε(z − x)
|z − x|
= z − x .
Thus the point xτ∗ is actually randomly chosen (radially weighted) around
z. To be more precise, in case (i), we have
xτ∗ = z +
∑
k∈I3
uk . (3.8)
On the other hand, in the cases (i) and (ii) there is actually never more than
2r
ε +m vectors which are not cancelled in the sum∑
k∈I1
u1k +
∑
k∈I2
u2k.
This, combined with condition (iii) guarantees that when the game is run-
ning, we never exit B6r(z0).
The most crucial point of our proof is the following cancellation effect.
Let S0I be the corresponding cancellation strategy for Player I when starting
from y. Then
E
x
SI,S0II
[uε(xτ∗) | game ends by condition (i)]
=Ey
S0
I
,SII
[uε(xτ∗) | game ends by condition (i)]
(3.9)
for any choice of the strategies SI or SII. Indeed, if the game ends by the
condition (i), then xτ∗ in (3.8) has only the random part which is indepen-
dent on the strategies and the point where the game started. By Lemma 2.3,
it holds that
uε(x) ≤ sup
SI
E
x
SI,S
0
II
[uε(xτ∗)].
Similarly,
uε(y) ≥ inf
SII
E
y
S0
I
,SII
[uε(xτ∗)].
Let us denote by P the probability that the game ends by the condition (i),
which only depends on p and n. Using the above estimates, the equation
(3.9) to eliminate the symmetric part, and recalling that when the game is
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running, we never exit B6r(z0), we get
|uε(x)− uε(y)| ≤
∣∣∣∣∣supSI ExSI,S0II[uε(xτ∗)]− infSII EyS0I ,SII [uε(xτ∗)]
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣P (ExSI,S0II[uε(xτ∗) | (i)]− EyS0I ,SII[uε(xτ∗) | (i)])∣∣∣
+ (1− P )( sup
B6r(z0)
uε − inf
B6r(z0)
uε)
≤ (1− P )( sup
B6r(z0)
uε − inf
B6r(z0)
uε).
Finally, we verify that 1 − P is small enough. For that end observe that
with the choice t = mε the estimate for the ‘cylinder walk’ in Lemma 3.1
gives the upper bound for 1− P in the form
1− P ≤ C(p, n)(m+ 1)ε/r ≤ C ′|x− y|/r
for |x− y| ≥ ε. 
By a standard reasoning the previous result holds also for x, y ∈ 6B, and
if |x − y| < ε, one may choose z with |x − z| = |y − z| = ε and estimate
|uε(x) − uε(x)| ≤ |uε(x) − uε(z)| + |uε(z) − uε(y)|. As a direct corollary of
the previous result we hence obtain
Corollary 3.3. Let uε be a p-harmonious positive function in Ω. Then
osc(uε, Bρ) ≤ C(n, p)
ρ
r
osc(uε, Br)
whenever ε ≤ ρ ≤ r and B2r ⊂ Ω.
Let us recall that by [MPRd, Theorem 1.6] we may obtain p-harmonic
functions u (in the viscosity sense) as locally uniform limits of p-harmonious
functions uε, whose boundary values coincide with u. Moreover, viscosity
solutions to p-Laplacian coincide with the classical ones by [JLM01] (see
[JJ11] for easier proof of this fact). Hence we may let ε→ 0 in the previous
result to obtain
Corollary 3.4. Let u be a p-harmonic function in Ω. Then
osc(u,Bρ) ≤ C(n, p)
ρ
r
osc(u,Br)
whenever 0 < ρ < r with B2r ⊂ Ω.
4. Proof of Harnack’s inequality
We first establish a lemma that deduces a Harnack type bound for a given
function u just assuming a Ho¨lder type oscillation estimate and a fairly weak
assumption on the possible blowup of the function u in small balls. Using
this the p-harmonic Harnack will be a simple consequence of the Lipschitz
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bounds in the previous section and a simple comparision argument with the
fundamental solution.
Lemma 4.1 below deduces Harnack from just Ho¨lder type oscillation es-
timate together with a rather mild growth condition (see (4.11)), which in
particular holds for p-harmonic functions, as is verified after the proof of
the lemma. Hence it can also be used to prove Harnack if the oscillation
estimate is obtained by other means, like using the De Giorgi method.
Lemma 4.1. Let u be a positive and continuous function in B5(0) ⊂ R
n
normalized by u(0) = 1 and that satisfies for some constant C ≥ 1 and
exponent γ > 0 the oscillation estimate
osc (u,Br(x)) ≤ C
( r
R
)γ
sup
BR(x)
u (4.10)
for |x| ≤ 2 and 0 < r < R ≤ 1. Assume also that for some exponent λ > 0
one has
inf
Br(x)
u ≤ Cr−λ, (4.11)
for |x| ≤ 2 and r ≤ 1. Then
sup
B1(0)
u ≤ c(n,C, γ, λ) :=
(
21+λC)1+λ/γ ,
where C is larger of the constants in (4.10) and (4.11).
Proof. Set Rk = 2
1−k for k ∈ N. Let x1 = 0 and select x2 from {|x| = 1} so
that
u(x2) = max
B1(0)
u = max
BR1(x1)
u.
Continue inductively by choosing xk+1 from BRk(xk) so that
u(xk+1) = max
BRk (xk)
u =:Mk, for k ∈ N.
The idea of the proof is to observe that in a relatively small neighbourhood
of xk condition (4.11) shows that u has to take a relatively small value, and
when this value is compared toMk−1 = u(xk), the oscillation estimate forces
u to take relatively large value in point xk+1 near to xk. This allows us to
deduce that Mk/Mk−1 is bounded from below by some constant larger than
1. By iterating this we reach a contradiction. All this will work assuming
that M1 is large enough.
To commence with the detailed proof, set δ := (21+λC)−1/γ and assume
contrary to the claim that
M1 ≥
(
21+λC)1+λ/γ . (4.12)
We claim that this implies
Mk ≥ 2C(δRk+1)
−λ for k ≥ 1. (4.13)
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Since Rk → 0 as k → ∞ and |xk| ≤ R1 + R2 . . . = 2 for all k, this shows
that u is unbounded in B2(0). Hence (4.12) is impossible and the statement
of the lemma follows.
It remains to verify (4.13) assuming (4.12). For k = 1 one checks inequal-
ity (4.13) directly from the choice of δ and (4.12). Assume that it is true for
all indices k ≤ j, where j ≥ 1. Pick any k ∈ {2, . . . , j + 1}. By (4.11) and
the induction hypothesis on (4.13) we have
inf
BδRk (xk)
u ≤ C(δRk)
−λ ≤Mk−1/2 = u(xk)/2.
An application of the oscillation condition to the concentric discs BδRk(xk) ⊂
BRk(xk) together with the previous estimate yields that
Mk = sup
BRk (xk)
u ≥ C−1δ−γ
(
sup
BδRk (xk)
u− inf
BδRk (xk)
u
)
≥ C−1δ−γ
(
u(xk)−
u(xk)
2
)
= C−1δ−γ
Mk
2
. (4.14)
By writing this for all k ∈ {2, . . . j + 1} and multiplying the equations
together we obtain
Mj+1 ≥
(
C−1δ−γ/2
)j
M1. (4.15)
We see that condition (4.13) holds for k = j + 1 if one has(
C−1δ−γ/2
)j
M1 ≥ 2C(δRj+2)
−λ, (4.16)
and a simplification shows that due to (4.12) this holds for the chosen value
of δ. 
Proof of Harnacks inequality for p-harmonic functions. By scaling and trans-
lation it is enough to check that a positive p-harmonic function u in the do-
main B5(0), normalized with u(0) = 1 satisfies the conditions of the previous
lemma.
The oscillation estimate (4.10) with γ = 1 was achieved in Corollary 3.4.
In turn, (4.11) is obtained with simple comparison with the fundamental
solution. We may assume that 0 6∈ Br(z). Set κ(p) := (n − p)/(p − 1).
Consider first the case p < n and the fundamental solution in B3(z) \Br(z)
v(x) := 2
(|x− z|−κ(p) − 3−κ(p))
(|z|−κ(p) − 3−κ(p))
.
If u|∂Br(z) ≥ v|∂Br(z), then v ≤ u in B3(z)\Br(z) and hence u(0) ≥ v(0) = 2,
which is a contradiction. Thus, since u attains the infimum at the boundary
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of Br(z), we have
inf
Br(z)
u ≤ 2
(r−κ(p) − 3−κ(p))
(|z|−κ(p) − 3−κ(p))
≤ c(p)r−κ(p),
whence one may choose λ = κ(p) in (4.11).
If p = n, similar comparison with the judiciously chosen fundamental
solution c1 log(1/|x−z|)+c2 produces even stronger (logarithmic) estimate,
and we may choose λ > 0 arbitrarily in (4.11). Finally, the same conclusion is
obtained in case p > n by employing the fundamental solution c1|x|
−κ(p)+c2,
where now κ(p) < 0. 
Remark 4.2. It is interesting to note that in the given proof of lemma 4.1
one cannot much weaken the Ho¨lder type of the assumed oscillation bound.
5. Harnack’s inequality for p-harmonious functions
The proof of Harnack’s inequality for p-harmonious functions essentially
uses the idea of lemma 4.1. Minor changes are needed due to the fact that
the Lipschitz estimate of Theorem 3.2 is valid only for distances of order
& ε. This difficulty will be overcome by stopping the iterative construction
in the proof of lemma 4.1 at the level Rk ∼ ε and invoking the second part
of the following lemma. In turn, the first part of the lemma verifies that
p-harmonious functions obey the condition (4.11) up to level r ∼ ε.
Lemma 5.1. Assume that uε is a positive p-harmonius function (p > 2 and
ε < 1/10) in B5(0) ⊂ R
n, normalized by uε(0) = 1. Then
(i) uε satisfies condition (4.11) of Lemma 4.1 with λ = n, for r ≥ ε, i.e
inf
Br(z)
uε ≤ Cr
−n,
for |z| ≤ 2 and r ∈ (2ε, 1), where C depends only on p and n.
(ii) If x, y ∈ B3(0) with |x− y| ≤ 10ε, then
uε(x) ≥ cuε(y),
where c only depends on p and n.
Proof. Let U = B4(z)\Br(z), where we may assume that 0 ∈ U.We consider
the game that starts from x0 = 0 and in which Player I uses the strategy
S0I , where she always moves a maximal step towards z. The game is stopped
at the ε-boundary Γε of U and employing the boundary values (uε)|Γε . The
corresponding stopping time is denoted by τ∗.
In order to estimate the probability of stopping at the inner boundary,
we use an auxiliary function v that is harmonic in U with boundary values{
v = 1 on Br(z),
v = 0 on ∂B4(z),
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In other words v(x) = (|x − z|2−n − 42−n)(r2−n − 42−n)−1 if n ≥ 3 and
v(x) = log(4/|x − z|)(log 4/r)−1 in case n = 2. Actually, we employ v in
Γε ∪ U , but the above formulas hold verbatim.
Let us observe that in both the cases there is a constant c > 0 that
depends only on dimension so that
v(0) ≥ crn. (5.17)
Then v(xk) is a submartingale for any strategy SII for player II since
E
x0
S0
I
,SII
[v(xk+1)|x0, x1, . . . , xk]
≥ β
∫
Bε(xk)
v dy +
α
2
(
v
(
xk + ε
(z − xk)
|z − xk|
)
+ v
(
xk − ε
(z − xk)
|z − xk|
))
≥ βv(xk) + αv(xk) = v(xk),
where we used the mean value property of u together with the facts that
y 7→ v(x + y) is radially decreasing and the map 0 < t 7→ v(x + ty0) is
convex for any fixed y0 6= 0. Denote by P the probability of stopping at the
inner boundary. The optional stopping theorem yields (independent of the
strategy SII)
crn ≤ v(0) = v(x0) ≤ E
x0
S0
I
,SII
[v(xτ∗)] ≤ 2
n+1P,
since v ≤ 2n+1 in Br−ε(z) \ Br(z) and v ≤ 0 in B4+ε(z) \ B4(z). Thus
P ≥ c′rn. Finally, we obtain by Lemma 2.3
1 = uε(x0) ≥ inf
SII
E
x0
S0
I
,SII
[uε(xτ∗)] ≥ P inf
Br(z)
uε ≥ c
′rn inf
Br(z)
uε ,
and the claim follows.
In order to prove (ii), consider simply the game that starts from x, where
Player I uses the strategy S0I where he takes (ε/2)-step towards y, and
actually jumps to y if this is in his reach. The game is stopped at τ∗∗ as we
reach either y or the ε-boundary B2+ε(x)\B2(x). Obviously the probability
to stop at y exceeds (α/2)20, whence again by Lemma 2.3 we obtain that
uε(x) = uε(x0) ≥ inf
SII
E
x0
S0
I
,SII
[uε(xτ∗∗)] ≥ (α/2)
20uε(y),
which proves (ii) with c = (α/2)20. 
We are ready to establish Harnack’s inequality for p-harmonious func-
tions. The idea of the proof follows that of Lemma 4.1, the necessary mod-
ifications are due to two facts: first of all, uε needs not to be continuous
whence the choice of the points xn must be adjusted. Secondly, Corollary
3.3 is valid only in the range r > ε so that iteration has to be stopped before
that level.
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Theorem 5.2. Let ε < ε0(p, n) and assume that uε is a positive p-harmonious
function in B10(0), normalized by uε(0) = 1. Then
sup
B1(0)
uε ≤ C(p, n).
Proof. Corollary 3.3 yields that
osc (uε, Br(x)) ≤ C
( r
R
)
osc (uε, BR(x)) (5.18)
for |x| ≤ 4 and ε < r < R ≤ 2. We may increase C if needed so that it also
works for Lemma 5.1. Due to this lemma we also have the counterpart of
(4.11) for r > ε, with λ = n. Actually, it also holds with λ = 2n, since in
this case the statement is weaker, and we can run the proof of Lemma 4.1
with this exponent. In particular, we choose δ := (22n+1C)−1and use the
counter assumption (4.12).
We only indicate the changes, assuming that the reader keeps the proof
of Lemma 4.1 in mind: this time we use the iteration to select xk+1 from
BRk+ε(xk)\BRk(xk) ⊂ B2Rk(xk) by the maximum principle for p-harmonious
functions so that
Mk := uε(xk+1) ≥ sup
BRk (xk)
uε.
This will be performed for k = 1, . . . , k0, where k0 is chosen so that δRk0 ∈
(2ε, 4ε]. We observe that |xk+1 − xk| ≤ 2Rk, and hence all the points xk lie
inside the ball B4(0).
As before we obtain (4.15) for j = k0 − 1. Together with Lemma 5.1 (i)
it implies that
c ≥
supx∈BδRk0 (xk0 )
uε(x)
infx∈BδRk (xk0 )
uε(x)
≥
uε(xk0)
C(δRk0)
−n
=
Mk0−1
C(δRk0)
−n
≥
(C−1δ−1/2)k0−2M1
C(δ21−k0)−n
≥ C ′′(Cδ2n+1)−k0 .
Above the first inequality comes from Lemma 5.1 (ii) and the observation
that diam(BδRk0 ) ≤ 8ε. We have δ = (2
2n+1C)−1, so that Cδ2n+1 < 1 and
the above inequality yields a contradiction is k0 is large enough, i.e. if ε > 0
is small enough. 
Remark 5.3. One of the main results of [MPRd] is the convergence uε → u,
where u is the p-harmonic function with the same boundary values as the
functions (uε)ε>0, see [MPRd, Theorem 1.6] for the precise formulation. In
that result the boundary values are assumed to be continuous in order first
to obtain of the existence a uniform continuous limit in [MPRd, Corollary
4.7]. The p-harmonicity of the limit is then established through viscosity
theory. One may apply our Theorem 5.2 (alternatively already the Lipschitz
estimate Corollary 3.3) to obtain a quick argument for [MPRd, Corollary
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4.7]), and generalize it to the case where one just assumes the boundedness
from the boundary values.
6. Harnack’s inequality when p > n
There is an alternative proof for Harnack’s inequality when p > n. This
proof is based on a stronger fact that in this case a player has a strategy
of forcing the game position to a point with a uniform positive probability
before exiting a larger ball. This result is based on the use of the funda-
mental solution to the p-Laplace equation and an iteration argument, see
Proposition 1.1 (ii) in [PS08]. The proof can be modified for the version of
the game considered in this paper, and thus we have
Theorem 6.1. Let p > n, Ω = B1(0)\{0} and x0 a starting point such that
|x0| <
1
2 . Then Player I has a strategy such that the probability of reaching
{0} before exiting B1(0) is uniformly larger than zero for all small ε.
Corollary 6.2 (Harnack). Let p > n and uε be a positive p-harmonious
function in Ω. Then
sup
Bρ(z0)
uε ≤ C inf
Bρ(z0)
uε
for B5ρ(z0) ⊂ Ω with a constant C independent of u.
Proof. Let η > 0, and choose a point x ∈ Bρ(z0) so that
uε(x) ≤ inf
Bρ(z0)
uε + η,
and z ∈ Bρ(z0) so that
u(z) ≥ sup
Bρ(z0)
uε − η.
Denote r = |x− z| < 2ρ. According to Theorem 6.1, when at x, Player I
has a strategy S0I such that the probability P of reaching z before exiting
B2r(z) is uniformly larger than zero. We define a stopping time
τ∗ := inf{k : xk ∈ {z} ∪ (R
n \B2r(z))}.
By the above choices and Lemma 2.3, we have
inf
Bρ(z0)
uε + η ≥ uε(x) ≥ inf
SII
E
x
S0
I
,SII
(uε(xτ∗)) ≥ Puε(z) + (1− P ) · 0
≥ P ( sup
Bρ(z0)
uε − η). 
It is worth noting that in this range the PDE proofs also become easier,
see Serrin [Ser64] as well as [KMV96, Man94] in the case p > n − 1. There
is also an unpublished manuscript by T. Bhattacharya, which establishes
Harnack’s inequality by utilizing the fundamental solution in the case p > n.
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Appendix A. Hitting probabilities for cylinder walk
In this section we derive an estimate for the hitting probabilities for the
’linear part’ i.e. the cylinder walk. The estimate is fairly standard, but we
give a complete proof for the convenience of the reader.
There are two alternative arguments: The first one is to use a solution
to the underlying linear PDE, see Remark A.2. However, this approach is
quite similar to that in Lemma 4.5 in [MPRd], and thus we have decided to
use basic estimates in the stochastic analysis.
We start with properties of a standard random walk. For consistency, we
readily adopt the notation from the proof of Lemma 3.1 below.
Lemma A.1. Let ε < 1/4 and let t˜0, t˜1, . . . denote positions in a symmetric
random walk on the real axis with steps ±ε. The random walk is stopped
upon reaching R \ (0, 1), and the associated stopping time is denoted by τ˜g.
Then for any a > 0 we have
P
(
t˜τ˜g ≤ 0
)
≥ 1− (t˜0 + ε) and P
(
τ˜g ≥ aε
−2
)
≤ (t˜0 + 4ε)/a.
Proof. Observe that t˜j is martingale, and so is t˜
2
j − jε
2 since
((t˜j + ε)
2 + (t˜j − ε)
2)/2 = t˜2j + ε
2.
Denote p = P (t˜τ˜g ≤ 0) and deduce from optional stopping that
t˜0 = E t˜τ˜g ≥ p(−ε) + (1− p) · 1,
hence p ≥ (1− t˜0)(1 + ε)
−1 ≥ 1− t˜0 − ε. In a similar vain
t˜20 = (t˜
2
0 − 0) = E ((t˜τ˜g )
2 − τ˜gε
2) ≤ pε2 + (1− p)(1 + ε)2 − ε2E τ˜g,
yielding
E τ˜g ≤ ε
−2
(
(1 + ε)2 − p− t˜20) ≤ ε
−2(t˜0 + 4ε),
where we also utilized the above estimate for p. The second statement
follows from this by an application of Chebychev’s inequality. 
Recall next a standard large deviations bound for a sum of i.i.d. random
variables. Consider i.i.d. symmetric Rn-valued random variables Ym, m =
1, . . . , N , that are uniformly bounded: |Ym| ≤ b for all m. Then
P
(
max
1≤m≤N
|Y1 + . . . + Ym| ≥ λ
)
≤ 4n exp
(
−
λ2
2Nb2
)
, λ > 0. (1.19)
With factor 2 instead of 4 on the right hand side this is just Hoeffding’s
(or Bernstein’s or Azuma’s) inequality (see [GS01, Section 12.2]), and the
extra factor 2 comes from combining it with Le´vy-Kolmogorov’s inequal-
ity P
(
max1≤m≤N |Y1 + . . . + Ym| ≥ λ
)
≤ 2P
(
|Y1 + . . . + YN | ≥ λ
)
, see
[Shi96, Lemma 1 p. 397]. Most of the stated versions deal only with a one-
dimensional situation, but by considering each component separately just
adds the extra factor n to (1.19).
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We recall the definition of the cylinder walk: at a point (xj, tj) ∈ B2r(0)×
[0, 2r], where r > 0 is fixed and B2r(0) ⊂ R
n, we step with probability α/2
to the point (xj , tj − ε), and with α/2 to (xj , tj + ε). With probability β we
move to the point (xj+1, tj), where xj+1 is randomly chosen from the ball
Bε(xj).
Next we prove Lemma 3.1, which states that when starting the cylinder-
walk at the point (0, t), then the probability that the walk does not escape
the cylinder through its bottom is less than C(p, n)(t+ ε)/r.
Proof of Lemma 3.1. We first reduce by scaling to the case r = 1/2. The
cylinder walk can be equivalently constructed by combining three indepen-
dent random constructions: The first item is a ’horizontal’ and symmetric
random walk where x˜0 = 0 and the point x˜j+1 is chosen according to a uni-
form distribution in Bε(xj) ⊂ R
n. The second is a random walk equivalent
to the walk considered in Lemma A.1 with positions t˜j and t˜0 = t. The
third is the increasing sequence
Uj =
j∑
m=1
Zm,
where the Zm:s are independent Bernoulli variables with Zm ∈ {0, 1} and
P (Zm = 1) = α. Then a copy of the cylinder walk is obtained by setting for
j ≥ 0
tj = t˜Uj , xj = x˜j−Uj .
Apply first Hoeffding’s inequality with Ym = Zm − α, λ = jα/2, b =
1, N = j to get
P (Uj ≤ αj/2) ≤ P (|Uj − jα| ≥ jα/2) ≤ 2 exp(−jα
2/8). (1.20)
Set
A := {Uj > αj/2 for all j ≥ 1/ε}.
Then summing (1.20) up for all indices in the range j ≥ 1/ε yields
P (Ac) = P (Uj ≤ αj/2 for some j ≥ 1/ε)
≤ P (∪j≥ 1
ε
{Uj ≤ αj/2})
≤
∑
j≥1/ε
P (Uj ≤ αj/2) ≤
∑
j≥1/ε
2 exp(−jα2/8) ≤ O(ε).
(1.21)
Let τg (resp. τ˜g) stand for the first moment when tj (resp. t˜j) steps
out from (0,1), and similarly let τb (resp. τ˜b) stand for first time when
|xj| (resp. |x˜j|) reaches [1,∞). Here the subindex g refers to the ‘good’
stopping, i.e. to the situation where the walk reaches the bottom or the top
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of the cylinder, and b to the ‘bad’ one where the walk reaches the vertical
boundary. Consider the event
B := A ∩ {τ˜b ≥ 1/ε}
By applying (1.21) and (1.19) it follows that
P (Bc) ≤ P (Ac) + P (τ˜b < 1/ε)
≤ O(ε) + 4n exp(−1/(2ε))
≤ O(ε),
(1.22)
where in the second inequality we estimated with Ym = x˜m, λ = 1, b = ε,
and N = 1/ε that P (τ˜b < 1/ε) ≤ P (max1≤m≤N |x˜1 + . . . + x˜m| ≥ λ) ≤
4n exp(−1/(2ε)).
It always holds that τb ≥ τ˜b, and so in the set {τb ≤ τg} ∩ B one has
τg ≥ τb ≥ τ˜b ≥ 1/ε. Since τg ≥ 1/ε in {τb ≤ τg} ∩B ⊂ A, we may apply the
definition of A to deduce
τ˜g ≤ τg ≤ (2/α)τ˜g ,
i.e. {τb ≤ τg} ∩B ⊂ {τ˜g ≤ (2/α)τ˜g}. Thus by Lemma A.1 and the indepen-
dence of τ˜g and τ˜b we can estimate
P ({τb ≤ τg} ∩B) ≤ P (τ˜g > ε
−2) + P (τ˜b ≤ (α/2)τ˜g and τ˜g ≤ ε
−2)
≤ O(t) +
∞∑
ℓ=1
P
(
ε−2/(ℓ+ 1) ≤ τ˜g ≤ ε
−2/ℓ and τ˜b ≤ (2/α)ε
−2/(ℓ+ 1)
)
≤ O(t) +
∞∑
ℓ=1
P
(
τ˜g ≥ ε
−2/(ℓ+ 1)
)
P
(
τ˜b ≤ (2/α)ε
−2/(ℓ+ 1)
)
.
Then by using Lemma A.1 again and estimating P
(
τ˜b ≤ (2/α)ε
−2/(ℓ+ 1)
)
by using (1.19) similarly as before, we get
P ({τb ≤ τg} ∩B) ≤ O(t) +
∞∑
ℓ=1
(
(t+ 4ε)(ℓ + 1)
)(
4n exp(−(ℓ+ 1)α/4)
)
≤ O(t+ ε).
By combining this with (1.22) and Lemma A.1 we get the desired upper
bound
P (τb ≤ τg or tτg ≥ 1) ≤ P ({τb ≤ τg} ∩B) + P (B
c) + (t+ ε) = O(t+ ε). 
Remark A.2. Let us outline an alternative proof for Lemma 3.1, again
assuming r = 1/2. Write U := B1(0) × (0, 1). Find a solution u ≤ 1 to a
linear PDE (p− 2)utt + ux1x1 + . . .+ uxnxn = 0 in a larger domain so that
u(x,−ε) = 1 for x ∈ B1/2(0),
and such that
u ≤ 0 on ∂U \ (B1(0)× {0}).
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An explicit solution to this problem can be obtained by scaling from a
harmonic function. Consider the sequence of random variables u(xj , tj),
j = 1, 2, . . . , where (xj , tj)j∈N are the positions in the cylinder walk. Now u
satisfies
u(x, t) = β
∫
Bε(x)
u dy +
α
2
(
u(x, t+ ε) + u(x, t− ε)
)
+O(ε3). (1.23)
This makes Mj := u(xj , tj) + cjε
3 a submartingale. Hence by optional
stopping, using the stopping time τ ′ that corresponds to exit from U , we
deduce that
E[u(xτ ′ , tτ ′) + cτ
′ε3] ≥M0 = u(0, t).
We recall that E[u(xτ ′ , tτ ′)] gives a lower bound for the desired probability
of exiting through the bottom, up to certain error. This error arises from
not stopping exactly on the boundary of U , but it is clearly of order O(ε)
by the smoothness of u. Now E τ ′ ≤ Cε−2, as a simple variant of Lemma
A.1 shows, applied just on the t-component of the walk. Finally the result
follows by combining these observations with the inequality u(0, t) ≥ 1− c′t.
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